L INFORMAL INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this note is to give a simple proof which shows that in many interesting mathematical théories for every formai (mechanical) proof method, there exists infinité sets of "trivially true" theorems which require as long proofs in the given formalism as the hardest theorems. Surprisingly, some of these infinité sets of trivially true,theorems with long proofs, can be found effectively for every given proof procedure and thus the proof procedure can be replaced by another one which shortens the proofs of infinitely many theorems without increasing the length of proofs for any others. For related work, see [2, 8] .
These results hold for many axiomatizable as well as decidable mathematical théories. They also show that there exist recursive functions and recursive sets for which every algorithm Computing them can be effectively speeded-up infinitely often. Furthermore, these recursive functions appear naturally, and we observe that spécifie combinatorial problems fall in the class of problems for which every algorithm can be effectively speeded up. Thus for many computations there do not exist optimal algorithms and every given one can be effectively speeded up infinitely often. These results show very clearly that we pay a price for formalizing mathematics. In every formalization, infinité sets of trivial theorems will require very long proofs. Thus giving a very dramatic and quantitative explanation why we should not and in practice do not freeze a formalism when discussing or doing mathematics. It also gives a warning that a necessarily long proof in a formai system does not certify that the result is non-trivial.
These observations are particularly interesting in view of the recent results about décision complexity of decidable mathematical théories, which show that many of these théories, though decidable, are not practically decidable. For example, it has been shown that for the Pressburger Arithmetic, the first order theory of natural numbers under addition, any proof procedure is such that the length of the proofs cannot be bounded by a double exponential in the length of the theorems [3] , Some even more dramatic complexity results are known about other decidable théories [8] . Our observation adds the postscript, that not only are these théories very hard to décide, but that every décision procedure requires as much work (long proofs) as the hardest theorems in the theory on infinité sets of trivially true theorems and that from the description of the décision procedure, we can effectively obtain such infinité sets of trivially true theorems with long proofs. For related observations see also [8] .
It is interesting to compare these results with the Blum Speed-up Theorem [1] . We recall that Blum proved that for every recursive function g there exist recursive functions ƒ for which any algorithm can be speeded up by the function g almost everywhere. Unfortunately, even if a function ƒ has an almost everywhere speed-up, the faster algorithms cannot be found effectively from a given algorithm, nor could one effectively compute from which point on the speed-up started. Finally, there is a wide spread belief that functions with an almost everywhere speed-up are artificially constructed and that they do not appear naturally in mathematics or practical computing.
The situation with the functions, problems and mathematical théories which have speed-up infinitely often is quite different. This speed-up is effective and we can explicitely show subsets on which computations can be sped-up. Furthermore, we do not have to construct artificial examples to show existence of such speed-up. The most important mathematical théories have for every formalization proof-shortening infinitely often, and many combinatorial problems which we are interested in solving are such that every algorithm can be sped-up infinitely often. As a matter of fact, mathematical théories and sets which have speed-up infinitely often appear to be more natural than those which do not have such speed-up. See also [4, 6] .
Finally, it should be pointed out that it is not at all clear whether we can reap any practical benefits from the fact that for certain spécifie problems every algorithm for their solution will work unnecessariiy hard on an infinité set of simple cases of this problem. We can always find such an infinité set for these problems effectively from the description of the algorithm, but it may turn out that they do not appear often enough in practice to justify replacing the given algorithm by an improved one which we know can never be optimal.
IL SPEED-UP FOR CREATIVE SETS
It is well known that the provable theorems of many important mathematical théories form créative sets [7] . One such mathematical theory is Peano Arithmetic, which is based on Peano's axioms with those instances of the Peano induction axiom that can be expressed in elementary arithmetic. Several other well known examples can be easily found, and it is clear that the créative sets form a very important class of sets in mathematics [7] , We recalî that a set A, A ç S*, is créative iff A is recursively enumerable and there exists a recursive function a such that for every Turing machine M t , which enumerate a subset of
We can also define equivalently, a recursively enumerable set A to be créative iff every other recursively enumerable set B can be one-one reduced to A, i. e. there exists a one-one recursive function ƒ such that w is in B ifff(w) is in A. From these définitions it easily follows that ail créative sets are recursively isomorphic, i. e., if A and C are créative sets, ^çP and B ç F*, then there exists a recursive bijection ƒ : £* -• F* such that weA iff ƒ (w;) e B. Thus, but for a recursive translation, ail créative sets are the same, and as it will be seen, our results apply to ail of them.
In the first part of this paper we will study the difficulty of recognizing créative sets or equivalently the difficulty of proving theorems in mathematical théories, like the Peano Arithmetic. A natural measure of the difnculty of proving a theorem in a formai mathematical theory is the length of the shortest proof. Unfortunately, to do this, we have to know explicitely how the theory is axiomatized and what proof procedures are used. To avoid such unnecessary difficultés we will measure the difficulty of recognizing sets (of provable theorems) by the amount of tape used by Turing machines recognizing these sets. Intuitively, this measure can be justified by observing that for any (reasonabie) proof procedure, we can design a Turing machine which for any given theorem successively checks ail possible proofs of increasing length until it finds a proof of the given theorem (or never halts if the input is not a provable theorem). Clearly, the amount of tape used by this Turing machine is a lower bound for the length of the proof and corresponds, intuitively, directly to the amount of erasable blackboard space needed to verify the proof or present it. or M,-uses more tape than Mj on {i, j, u?)}.
Where i and j are binary représentations of the corresponding integers and (f, j\ w) is the séquence i, j, w enclosed in parentheses. We say that Mj uses more than M { on input x if M ( uses a finite amount of tape and Mj uses at least one more tape square than M t on input x.
We now show that the set L Q is recursively enumerable. We observe that for any Turing machine M t , input x and integer k we can recursively décide whether M t for input x uses more than k tape squares. If M f uses less than k tape squares for input x we can décide whether x is accepted by M t or not. 
Thus L o is a créative set, as was to be shown. From this result we immediately get the following.
COROLLARY 3: For every Turing machine which recognizes L o and every recursive function f we can effectively find an infinité regular subset of L o on which for each input of length n M io uses at least f(n) tape squares for its récognition,
Proof: Immédiate from previous theorem. From this result it follows that for every recognizer M io of L o we can effectively obtain infinité subsets of L o on which M io uses large amounts of tape but which can be recognized by finite automata, since they are regular subsets.
Considering the members of L o as provable theorems of a mathematical theory, the result asserts that every formalization of this mathematical theory will have infinité sets of "trivially" true theorems but which in the formalism require horrendously long proofs.
To illustrate this, assume that we have a first order mathematical theory with the standard logical connectives and in which we can express such concepts as "M t uses less tape than M i on input x" and "M; does not accept the input x."
Assume that the theory is strong enough to prove all true statements of the form "Mj uses less tape than M t on input (f, j, w) or M t uses less tape then M } and does not accept the input (i, j\ w;)."
For example, the Peano Arithmetic is such a mathematical theory. From our previous result we see that any proof procedure for this mathematical theory will have easily recognizable infinité sets of true theorems such that the length of their shortest proofs in the given formalizm will grow faster than any given recursive function (of the length of the theorems to be proved). Proof: This follows from the fact that all créative sets are recursively isomorphic and that the recursive isomorphic function can be computed on a recursively bounded amount of tape.
The family of recursively enumerable sets which have effective speed-up of the type we proved for créative sets has been completely characterized in [2] and Corollary 4 follows from this genera! characterization» though these proofs are quite complicated.
HL SUBRECURSIVE ANALOGUES
Let L t (n) be the maximal number of tape square used by the Tm M t on inputs of length n. We say that a total function L (n) is tape constructable iff there exists a Tm M i such that L (n) = L ( (ri). The following result has been credited to A. Meyer in [8] and is stated there without proof. The auther obtained it independently and only then became aware of its statement in [8] . , w) is accepted or not. In either case, we get a contradiction:
Thus we must conclude that R io e y4 L and that on all inputs
This complètes the proof.
n~*°°N ext we show that many decidable mathematical théories must have trivial theorems requiring long proofs and that we can effectively find infinité sets of such trivial theorems with long proofs.
Let T be a consistant, decidable mathematical theory, let L and F be tape constructable functions such that for all n F(n-\-l) > F (n) ^ n and L (n) ^ n. Let there exist a Tm M which for each input (M t , w) writes a formula y it w in T such that: a) y it w is provable in T iff (Af,-, w) e A u that is iff the Turing machine Afj 
contradicting the fact that no such recognizer exists for A L .
We now show how to obtain the set T' using M ioo . We know that the regular set 
This complètes the pro of.
Recent work on the complexity of décision procedures for decidable mathematical théories has shown how statements about Turing machine computations can be efficïently encoded in formulas in these théories so that the statement about the Tm compilation is true iff the formula is provable in the theory [3, 8] , These results can be used not only to esta,blish the complexity of the décision procedures, but also the existance of speed-up for most of these décision procedures [8] , For example, it has been shown [8] that the set M = { R | R is a regular expression over 0, 1, (.), -, -f-, ~l, *, denoting the empty set} cannot be recognized on tape bounded by an elementary function. By the same techniques it follows that every Tm recognizing this set can be effectively speeded-up by any desired "stack of exponentials" on infinité subsets of M,
We conclude with a look at time complexity of décision procedures and speed-up of proofs for Pressburger Arithmetic [3] .
Let T t (n) be the maximal number of steps taken by the Tm M t on inputs of length n. We say that T{n) is time-constructable iff T(n) = T t (n) for some M t . Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 5. The only différence is in the factor log T(n) which appears because we have to use a less efficient simulation algorithm than in the tape complexity case [5] .
We recall that the Pressburger Arithmetic (PA) is the first order theory of addition of natural numbers [3] . This theory is decidable and it "is one of the simplest, most basic, imaginable mathematical théories" [3] , Furthermore, it has been shown that any non-deterministic Tm recognizing the true theorems of PA must use at least time
T(n) = 2 2cn
for some c > 0.
From this, one concludes that any "reasonable" proof procedure for PA will have theorems of length n whose shortest proof must be longer than 2 2cn [3] . We add to this result the following observation. Proof: By a close inspection of the proof techniques used in [3] and using reasoning similar to that in the proof of Corollaries 6 and 7, we can construct the set T' of sentences Ji OtW in PA asserting that M io does not accept the input (M iQt J in time 
